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THE PLACE OF COURT-CONNECTED
MEDIATION IN A DEMOCRATIC
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Nancy A. Welsh *
A justice system, and the processes located within it, ought to
deliver justice.' That seems simple enough. But, of course, deliv-
ering justice is never so simple. Justice and the systems that serve
it are the creatures of context.
This Article will consider mediation as just one innovation
within the much larger evolution of the judicial system of the
United States. First, this Article will outline how the values of
democratic governance undergird our traditional picture of the
American justice system, presumably because the invocation of
such values helps the system to deliver something that will be
respected by the nation's citizens as "justice." The Article will then
highlight particular aspects of the changing picture of the Ameri-
can civil justice system to suggest that today's sprawling and multi-
tiered structure is increasingly disengaged from its democratic
roots. Finally, the Article will examine the place of court-con-
nected mediation in this evolution. Is it part of the reinvigoration
or further erosion of a democratic justice system?
I. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING JUSTICE
Much has been written about the inevitable subjectivity of de-
fining justice.2 Reflecting different circumstances, personalities,
and cultures, people apply widely varying criteria to determine
whether particular outcomes are fair.' Equality, need, generosity,
* Associate Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity; B.A., magna cum laude, 1979, Allegheny College; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1982. My
thanks to Brian Ford for his research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Note, Caroline Harris Crown, The Alternative Dispute Resolution of 1998:
Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1768 (2001).
2 See generally Crown, supra note 1.
3 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem With Contractarian
Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2003) (examining the role of justice
in procedural rules). See also Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We
Found A Better Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 93 (2002) (reviewing court-ordered
ADR's role in providing "justice" to parties); see also Robert L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little
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envy, equity-all of these represent legitimate but very different
bases for generating "fair" or "just" outcomes.4 Beyond this, peo-
ple's perceptions of justice seem inevitably affected by self-interest,
or an "egocentric bias. '5 Often unconsciously and quite naturally,
people define fair outcomes in ways that favor themselves.6
Given the difficulty-indeed, the apparent impossibility-of
producing outcomes that everyone will immediately embrace as
"just," the best that a society may be able to do is to focus upon
who will be permitted to decree particular outcomes as just (with
the enforcement power of the state to back such decrees) and how
these persons will reach their decisions.7 Different nations have
established strikingly different justice systems,8 all nonetheless
(Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant
Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. Disv. RESOL. 367 (2002).
4 See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation __ MARO. L. REV.
- (2004) (forthcoming, on file with the author) (describing different criteria that people
use in defining substantive justice and variables that affect the selection of such criteria).
5 See Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgment of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 1337 (1995).
6 See id. See also Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict
Resolution and How to Overcome Them, in HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Mor-
ton Deutsch & Peter Coleman, eds., 2000).
7 The procedural justice literature is quite helpful regarding this second element and
suggests that decisions should be made only after disputants have had an opportunity to be
heard and the decision-maker has considered their views or arguments while treating the
disputants in an even-handed and dignified manner. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in
Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787,
817-30 (2001) (describing the effects and characteristics of procedural justice, as well as
theories explaining those effects).
8 The United States, for example, has a justice system that is characterized by substan-
tial party control. The litigants define the issues, determine what discovery to conduct,
raise the issues that will be tested through motion practice, and ultimately control the pres-
entation of the evidence to the judge or jury. Attorneys' primary loyalty is to their clients,
and attorneys advocate on their clients' behalf. This is the system that Civil Procedure and
Advocacy professors present to American law students. In many other countries, mean-
while, parties' control over their cases is much more restricted. Judges, not litigants or
their attorneys, determine the issues that will be explored, the discovery that will be con-
ducted, the witnesses who will be called, and the questions that the witnesses will answer.
The parties' testimony is neither sought nor trusted, and the attorneys represent "indepen-
dent organ[s] of the administration of justice... mean[ing] independence from the client as
well as from the state." DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 67-
103 (1988). See also Oscar Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J.
INTL. & COMP. L. 1 (1997); John H. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5
CARDOZO J. INTL. & COMP. L. 41 (1997); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in
Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).
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aimed at the production of outcomes that are likely to be trusted
by citizens as sufficiently just.9
Inevitably, a society's values regarding the relationship be-
tween citizens and governmental authority influence the shape of
its justice system, particularly the criteria for selecting decision-
makers whose decisions will be enforced by the state and the pro-
cedures that those decision-makers will use. Democratic systems
of governance are characterized by procedures and structures de-
signed to hold "rulers ... accountable for their actions in a public
realm by citizens, acting independently or through the competition
and cooperation of their elected representatives."10 In a democ-
racy such as the United States, the rulers-including the decision-
makers-must submit to mechanisms that make them accountable
to "the people," and they draw legitimacy from such accountabil-
ity. 1 The transparency of this accountability affects democratic cit-
izens' ability to trust that their decision-makers will deliver fair
outcomes. It should not be surprising, therefore, that even though
American courts are often described as the least democratic branch
of government, their fundamental democratic pedigree is revealed
in the mechanisms established for the appointment of judges and
juries, the public nature of trials, the requirement of written opin-
ions and the availability of appeal.
The most transparent example of structuring American courts
to maximize accountability to "the people" involves the peculiarly
American institution of the civil jury. Historically, the colonists
viewed juries as the "guardians of local community values against
outsider judges appointed by the royal governor" and "as bulwarks
of integrity against corrupt public officials. '' 2 Leaders of the
9 See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis,
Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001)
(examining cultural differences and their effects on legal analysis). See also New Zealand
Modernizes Arbitration Act, 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 127 (1997) (discussing
New Zealand's legal approach in reforming its arbitral system to maximize benefits of arbi-
trations). See also Tom Arnold, Why is ADR the Answer?, 15 No. 7 COMPUTER LAW 13
(1998) (reviewing the use of ADR by other countries and its advantages over litigation).
10 Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is .... and Is Not, THE
GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 49, 49-50 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds.,
1993) cited in Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem with
Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (2004) (forthcoming, on file with author).
11 See generally Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Robe:
Judicial Elections, The First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 301 (2003) (describing the benefits of a democratic system in which judges can be
selected or appointed in part as representatives of the people).
12 STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND CON-
TEXT 434 (2000).
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movement for American independence complained mightily about
British attempts to reduce colonists' access to decision-making by
juries.13 Indeed, the importance of the right to civil jury trial
emerged in state legislatures' debates regarding ratification of the
Constitution. The Seventh Amendment ultimately provided that
"[I]n suits at common law, where the amount in controversy ex-
ceeds twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be pre-
served. . ." By 1835, Alexis de Toqueville proclaimed the
American jury as:
one form of the sovereignty of the people... The jury, and more
especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the spirit of the
judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the
habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free insti-
tutions... It invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it
makes them all feel the duties which they are bound to dis-
charge towards society and the part which they take in its
government.14
A more contemporary commentator has observed: "More
than when they vote, or pay taxes, or attend a parade, they [jurors]
are realizing the democratic vision that still sustains our nation:
They are governing themselves."' 5
The selection of federal and state judges is also grounded in
the democratic presumption of accountability to "the people."' 6
Federal judges are nominated by an elected President and installed
only after elected U.S. Senators have approved them.' 7 State
judges, similarly, are selected by elected representatives "of the
13 See id. Juries were mentioned in the Declaration of Independence. Once the colo-
nies had achieved independence and American judges headed various courts, however,
some of the new nation's leaders feared that juries "were thwarting creditors from collect-
ing on their debts and jeopardizing [America's] economic stability." Id. As a result, they
sought to reduce the influence of civil juries and succeeded in blocking any mention of
them in the Constitution drafted at the Constitutional Convention. See id.
14 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, PT. II, CH. B (1835).
15 STEPHEN J. ADLER, TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 242 (1994).
See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDOING THE JURY 247-49 (1986) (the jury is an
important symbol [of democracy] that helps to confer legitimacy to law. . . Not only does
the jury system allow the people to contribute to the legal system, but the legal system,
through the jury, contributes to the education of the people).
16 See generally Dimino, supra note 11.
17 Of course, there are occasional and unfortunate exceptions to this process. For ex-
ample, President George W. Bush recently appointed two judges to the federal bench
while the U.S. Senate was in recess. See, e.g., Charles Hurt, Daschle Threatens to Block All
Bush Judicial Nominees, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2004, available at http://www.washington
times.com/national/20040326-112701-8188r.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
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people"-or must face direct election and re-election by citizens. 18
Though both appointment and election have potential disadvan-
tages,19 such approaches to selection at least acknowledge citizens'
appropriate role in selecting the decision-makers whose rulings will
be enforced by the state. This form of selection also assures some
level of accountability by judges to the citizens. Indeed, perhaps
because many states' judges must return regularly to the citizens
for re-election, these courts are more likely than federal courts to
include citizen representatives in their planning processes and to
focus on the need to provide "user-oriented" access.20
Traditionally, then, when we have described the American jus-
tice system, we have drawn a clear relationship between demo-
cratic governance and the identification of the decision-makers
whose determinations of elusive "justice" will be enforced as pro-
nouncements of the state. This picture assumes the appropriate-
ness of accountability to "the people." The traditional picture,
however, no longer sufficiently represents the reality of the U.S.
justice system. It may even misrepresent the bulk of that system
and its level of accountability to a democratic citizenry.
II. DRIFTING FROM DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AS
THE SAFEGUARD OF "JUSTICE"
For the past several decades, nearly every democratic institu-
tion has come under increasingly injurious attack as inefficient, un-
able to fulfill its mission, and often inept.21 The public justice
system has been no exception.22 Critics have derided the courts as
18 For a comparative analysis of different means of selecting state and federal judges,
see Alain A Levasseur. Legitimacy of Judges, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (2002).
19 See Judith Resnik, Uncle Sam Modernizes his Justice: Inventing the Federal District
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L. J.
607, 662 n. 244, 669 (2002) (raising concerns regarding the effect of these processes on
judicial independence and observing that "money and politics can play large roles in who
can become a judge.").
20 See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury, Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1022-24 n. 381, n. 385 (2000).
21 Public schools, Amtrak, and the United States Post Office are among the most obvi-
ous examples.
22 See, e.g., Karen L. Kennard, Comment, The Victim's Veto: A Way to Increase Victim
Impact on Criminal Case Disposition, 77 CAL. L. REV. 417, 417 (1998). "Victim withdrawal
from the criminal justice process creates a public impression that the system is inefficient
and unresponsive, and thus, exponentially increases the likelihood that more victims will
be deterred from reporting crimes and testifying in court." Id.
2004]
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"dysfunctional. '2 3 Its juries who are supposed to represent the citi-
zenry are marred by "rogue" or "runaway" tendencies.2 4 Judges
are "arbitrary. '2 5 Indeed, what is curious is that those closest to
the courts-attorneys and judges-have been some of the most
consistent and vociferous critics of the justice system.26 Research
indicates, for example, that in meetings with clients, attorneys
often paint a bleak picture of the courts, emphasizing the likeli-
hood of ill-informed, disrespectful and arbitrary decision-making. 7
Judges, meanwhile, have expressed very serious "postmodern"
angst about their role. 28  Recently, one Pennsylvania trial court
judge wrote: "[H]aving watched the process as a judge for nearly
20 years, it seems to me that the legal system can produce stability,
predictability, recompense, retribution and perhaps many other
things. What we cannot produce is true justice. '2 9 Professor Judith
Resnik has written extensively about the federal courts' evolving
composition and self-understanding, concluding that, "the federal
judiciary has adopted an anti-adjudication and pro-settlement
agenda," which includes a diminution in the role of traditional
judges and the embrace of a variety of "new" quasi-judges or judi-
23 John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003).
24 See David E. Rovella, 1998 Jury Outlook Survey: Poll Elicits Fear of Rogue Jury,
NAT'L. L.J., Nov. 2, 1998, at A25.
25 Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79 (1997). "It might
well be maintained, indeed, that as between arbitrary action of the law in nearly all cases
because of the complexity of procedure, and arbitrary action of the judge in some cases,
the latter would be preferable." Id.
26 See Jean Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a Sys-
tem of Justice, 3 NEV. L. J. 289, 297 (2003).
27 See Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law
Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L. J. 1663, 1676-82 (1989) (recording divorce
lawyers' discussions with clients, advising against too much open communication and urg-
ing clients to adopt an affected poise).
28 Professor Judith Resnik has written:
[Fiederal judges begin to appear (oddly) aligned with movements denominated
"postmodern." Federal judges may press for settlement because they themselves
doubt their own capacities to find information sufficient to call "fact" and are pain-
fully aware of the plasticity of "law." Federal judges act as if they believe that stories
dissolve in endless variations, none of which justify the imposition of state power.
From this vantage point, federal judges can be understood as encouraging disputants
to do as they want, for in these private accords lies as much-or as little-as what
adjudication can offer.
Resnick, supra note 20, at 1003 (emphasis added).
29 John M. Cleland, A Place for Counselors and Peacemakers, 26 PA. LAW. 36, 37
(2004). See also Resnik, supra note 20, at 926 (describing a trial judge who "equated going
to trial with failure" and the frequency of the phrase "a bad settlement is almost always
better than a good trial" in judicial opinions) (emphasis added).
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cial adjuncts.3 ° In the process, the "markers of difference [between
traditional judges and other fact-finders] have diminished, while
enthusiasm for delegation has grown. '"31
This evolution may, as Professor Resnik suggests, represent
the judicial system's inventive (or desperate) response to the na-
tion's growing demand for adjudicative services accompanied by
politicians' refusal to allocate the funds needed for a significantly
expanded judiciary.32 The judicial system's evolution may even be
anticipated by organizational theories that predict that over-
whelmed organizations will react by "increasing the numbers and
kinds of providers, delegating duties, routinizing processes, and
reconfiguring the work."' 33 Indeed, social psychological theories
may have predicted the judicial system's recent tendency to mirror
the growth and bureaucratization of the other two branches of gov-
ernment and to spawn more tiers of hierarchy.34
Despite the explanations, however:
in reinventing the role of the judge, [the federal judiciary] has
also succeeded in undermining its singular claim to constitu-
tional protection... Judges have, through their practices and
doctrine, not only made plain the many facets of the role of
judge, (judge as settler, judge as negotiator, judge as manager,
judge as dealmaker) but also have so deconstructed judging that
it is at risk of being undermined as a politically or legally viable
concept.
3 5
30 See Resnik, supra note 20, at 995.
31 Resnik, supra note 19, at 641.
32 See Resnik, supra note 20, at 998. The extensive use of non-life-tenured judges also
permits federal courts to work around the frequent and long political delays associated
with the appointment and approval of federal judges. Professor Resnik aptly notes:
At least in some respects, rather than having been transformed into a co-equal
branch of government, the judiciary at times seems more like an ordinary agency.
petitioning for attention and hoping to achieve the budgetary goals it seeks. Recall
the image of a sprawling, multi-tiered judiciary, populated by 2000 judges and 30,000
staff. The federal judiciary, a bureaucratic institution, is heavily dependent on Con-
gress for resources.
Id. at 1011. See also Resnik, supra note 19, at 621.
33 Resnik, supra note 19, at 659.
34 See, e.g., id. at 619-20, 659-60, n. 235 and accompanying text.
35 Resnik also notes that:
[a] different kind of concern emerges about the deconstructive role of federal judges
if one is intent on federal judicial supremacy but worried about how to maintain it.
By encouraging a host of ADR providers, judges (who used to have a monopoly on
the provision of judicial services) have helped to launch their competitors and now
may have to jockey for what they deem to be the "good cases."
Resnik, supra note 20. at 1003 n. 316.
2004]
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The courts' expressions of self-doubt, though they evidence a
somewhat attractive humility, also hint at a worrisome insecurity
about publicly-elected and publicly-appointed judges' unique abil-
ity to declare justice in a democratic nation.36 Furthermore, the
courts' lack of self-esteem (some might even say self-loathing) has
paved the way for other, less introspective and less accountable
players to assume the role of decision-makers.37
A. Delegation and Deference to Adjudication
by Administrative Agencies
Employees of administrative agencies today provide the first
tier of adjudication for many, many disputes involving American
citizens and their government. American courts' reliance upon and
deference to the jurisdiction and decisions of this "hidden judici-
ary represents this Article's first example of disengaging the real
judicial system of the United States from meaningful democratic
accountability.
In 1934, proponents of the New Deal justified administrative
agencies' assumption of adjudicative powers by pointing out the
inadequacies of the courts: "the condition of our court dockets, the
congestion of court calendars, the interminable delays and innu-
merable reverses on technical judicial grounds, '39 and a conserva-
tive judiciary's hostility to needed governmental reforms.4 °
36 See Resnik, note 20, at 926. "Since the country's founding, the federal courts have
been identified as an important participant in national governance." Id.
37 This Article will not criticize the rise of court adjuncts whose role is explicitly defined
as assisting, rather than replacing, judges. The United States has a long history of such
judicial assistants (e.g., original magistrate judges, special masters, United States commis-
sioners). See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 20, at 986-89.
38 Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the 'Hidden Judiciary': How the Merit Process Works in
Choosing Administrative Law Judges (Part 1), 63 JUDICATURE 60 (1979).
39 A.B.A. Special Committee on Administrative Law, Report of the Committee, 1934
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 151 (statement of Charles N. Goodwin), cited in George B. Shepherd,
Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90
Nw. U. L. REv. 1557, 1574 (1996).
40 Many New Deal advocates viewed judges of the time as conservative and hostile to
the interests of those being served by New Deal agencies. See Resnik, supra note 19, at
635 (noting that "some progressives saw agency decision-making as a welcome escape from
the federal courts, perceived as unfriendly to small claimants and specially tied to corpo-
rate interests"); see also Shepherd, supra note 39, at 1574 (describing concerns of those
opposed to a proposal to establish a specialized administrative court, as a substitute for
administrative tribunals).
See also Stephen R. Alton:
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Initially, the Supreme Court objected to legislative and executive
attempts to usurp the courts' role, and even as recently as 1982,
ruled that Congress had gone too far in the powers granted to
bankruptcy judges. 41
By 1986, however, a majority of the Supreme Court had
adopted the anti-court sentiments of New Deal proponents. In
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,42 the Supreme
Court proclaimed a flexible balancing test to determine the consti-
tutionality of administrative adjudication of claims that normally
would have been heard and decided in the courts.43 The majority
observed admiringly that the administrative procedure at issue in
the case represented an "'inexpensive and expeditious' alternative
to existing fora available to aggrieved customers, namely, the
courts and arbitration[;] ' '44 "an agency's expertise is superior to
that of a court ' 45 when dealing with legislation that the agency is
responsible for enforcing; 46 and the courts should avoid "unduly
constrict[ing] Congress' ability to take needed and innovative ac-
tion... ,47 Not surprisingly, the majority found that the balancing
test favored agency adjudication.48
The Court 'cannot permanently be used as a conservative veto power,' Jackson pro-
claimed. Government by litigation was inefficient causing delay and uncertainty.
Jackson opined that the judges' 'almost oriental devotion to precedent' obviated
their 'need to reason' and restricted the actions not only of the legislative and the
executive branches, but of the courts themselves. The United States' 'complicated
governmental system,' steeped in federalism, required compromise and understand-
ing from all sides in order to solve 'basic problems arising out of the depression and
out of troubled industrial relations.' but 'the Courts have lately been closing the ways
to political compromise.' The Assistant Attorney General concluded by declaring
that Roosevelt sought 'in his policy and in his Court proposal to open the highway to
economic and social peace' and by warning that 'the closed road' may mean a rough
detour.
Loyal Lieutenant, Able Advocate: The Role of Robert H. Jackson in Franklin D. Roosevelt's
Battle with the Supreme Court. 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 527, 590-91 (1997).
41 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982). "In
sum, our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial
Power of the United States' must be reposed in an independent Judiciary. It commands
that the independence of the Judiciary must be jealously guarded, and it provides clear
institutional protections for that independence." Id.
42 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
43 The issue was whether an administrative agency had the jurisdiction to hear and
adjudicate common law counterclaims. See id.
44 Id. at 836.
45 Id. at 845.
46 See id. at 845.
47 Id. at 851.
48 See id. at 858.
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An obviously upset dissenting Justice Brennan expressed tre-
mendous frustration with the majority's "abdication to claims of
legislative convenience."4 9 Joined by Justice Marshall, Justice
Brennan highlighted the importance of protecting accountability in
a democratic system of governance:
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitu-
tional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes
that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those
hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived
under a form of government that permitted arbitrary govern-
mental acts to go unchecked... With all the obvious flaws of
delay [and] untidiness... we have not yet found a better way to
preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject
to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution. °
Justice Brennan further observed, "Convenience and effi-
ciency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of demo-
cratic government... "51
Partly as a result of courts' doctrinal and philosophical choices
like the one demonstrated in Commodity Futures, which seem to
"make an ever-larger path for Congress to create [non-traditional]
judgeships[,] ' ' 52 federal and state agencies today represent a vast
and parallel "set of courts, with a specialized focus frequently in-
volving claims against the government."53 There are many more
non-elected, non-legislatively-appointed judges located within fed-
eral agencies than there are traditional federal judges. In 2000, for
example, there were about 829 Article III judges (i.e., 650 federal
district court judges, 170 judges serving on federal courts of appeal,
and 9 Supreme Court justices).54 Meanwhile, federal agencies
housed more than 1,400 semi-independent administrative law
judges along with nearly 3,000 agency employees given titles, such
as "hearing officers," "presiding officers," or "hearing examiners,"
responsible for "fulfilling judge-like roles but doing so outside the
49 Id. at 863.
50 Id. at 864.
51 Id. at 864.
52 Resnik, supra note 19, at 626.
53 OWEN M. Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 37 (2003).
54 See id. at 33. In addition, in 2000, "about 315 bankruptcy judges and 450 magistrate
judges served for renewable terms." Id.
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confines"55 of the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA").
The number of cases handled by agency adjudicators dramatically
exceeds those filed in courts. In the late 1990's, for example, the
Social Security Administration handled more than 500,000 cases
per year, while there were about 260,000 civil filings in the federal
courts.5 6
Many have raised concerns regarding the relationship between
administrative adjudicators and the agencies that select them, em-
ploy them and then turn to them for decisions in disputed cases. 57
To reduce agencies' ability to influence individual Administrative
Law Judges ("ALJs"), the APA provides certain salary and em-
ployment protections;5 8 ALJs also may be disqualified on the basis
of personal bias.59 But most ALJs remain embedded within agen-
cies, and structural bias is rarely viewed as a sufficient basis for
disqualification or vacatur of an ALJ's decision. 6° The concerns
are even stronger for the hearing officers, presiding officers and
hearing examiners described supra. They do not come within the
protections of the APA, often are expected to serve multiple roles
(e.g., regulator and hearing examiner), and are given none of the
markers of judicial prestige. These conditions suggest strongly that
many administrative adjudicators will feel more accountable to the
agencies and their current interpretations of their missions, than to
"the people." Perhaps predictably, these largely-unprotected adju-
55 Id. at 40 (observing that these adjudicators represent the "hidden judiciary" and that
the number of hearing officers in different federal agencies varies dramatically, with one
full-time judicial officer in the United State Post Office in 2001 and 1,100 located in the
Social Security Administration); see also Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": In-
venting the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and
the Nation, 90 GEO. L. J. 607, 620 (2002).
56 Fiss & RESNIK, supra note 53, at 40.
57 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 861 (1986) (dis-
senting opinion of J. Brennan) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton),
regarding the "danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it").
See also Gerald Ruth, Unification of the Administrative Adjudicatory Process: An Emerg-
ing Framework to Increase "Judicialization" in Pennsylvania, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 297,
321-24 (1996) (describing several states' decision to establish central panel systems to in-
crease an ALJs' sense of independence from agencies).
58 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 5362, 4301 (providing for separation of adjudicative, investiga-
tive and prosecuting functions, removing agency control over tenure and compensation
decisions, and exempting ALJs from certain performance ratings); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.
& WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 240-42 (2d ed. 2001) (observing that the
APA seeks to promote AU's neutrality and that such neutrality would be aided by creat-
ing a "unified corps of ALJs and a central panel system" that would be separate from
individual agencies).
59 See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 58, at 249-53.
60 See id. at 249.
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dicators are the "judges" that agencies are adding in greater
numbers.6'
The justice provided by these non-democratically-selected
judges is supposed to be safeguarded by citizens' right to seek ap-
pellate review before a traditional court.62 The courts, however,
exercise an extraordinarily light supervisory touch over their ad-
ministrative delegates. First, the courts generally limit their review
to the record as developed by administrative courts, and may even
be satisfied with the findings of fact and reasoning contained in
administrative judges' opinions.63 Second, the courts grant great
deference 64 to the decisions of agencies' judges, generally not over-
turning them unless they are proven to be "arbitrary, capricious or
an abuse of discretion, ' '65 represent a "clear error''66 or violate
other, even more stringent standards.
Administrative agencies' usurpation of the judicial role is im-
portant as a matter of separation of powers and appropriate insti-
tutional relations among the various branches of government. But
61 See Resnik, supra note 19, at 662-63. See also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication:
Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 65, 70-71 (1996) (regarding
non-APA judges in Departments of Justice, Agriculture and Defense); Ronnie A. Yoder,
Retrospectives and Prospectives on ALJ Priorities - A Report in Progress, delivered at the
Federal Administrative Law Judges Seminar at Virginia Beach, Va. (Sept. 15, 1998) (on file
with the author).
62 See Resnik, supra note 19, at 638-40, 668; see also Richard Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 111, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923-33 (1988)
(summarizing case law permitting agency adjudication and relying upon judicial review as a
safeguard).
63 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 63-65 (1932) (providing for review based on
record as developed by administrative court); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 58, at 256-59
(describing record required to survive judicial review of informal agency action).
64 See Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283 (1986).
Affording deference to any agency's legal analysis, however, seems facially contrary
to the fundamental principle, incorporated in Chief Justice John Marshall's broad
dictum in Marbury v. Madison, that "[i]t is emphatically the duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is." Judicial deference to agencies' statutory interpreta-
tions thus constitutes a continuing source of tension for judges because it necessarily
means that an agency of the executive branch, to a greater or lesser degree, is dis-
placing the judiciary in its traditional and jealously guarded law-declaring function.
Largely because of this tension between the judiciary's law-declaring function and
the need to defer to congressional delegation, application of the deference doctrine
in the federal courts has been rather erratic.
Id.
65 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2)(B) (2004).
66 See generally Patricia Wald, Some Thoughts on Beginnings and Ends: Court of Ap-
peals Review of Administrative Law Judges' Findings and Opinions, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 661
(1989) (describing the critical role that fact-finding plays and the great deference accorded
to administrative law judges' findings, resulting in significant and growing power).
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the rise of decision-making by those who have neither been elected
nor appointed by elected officials (and who may be understood as
only "quasi-independent" of home agencies) also should raise con-
cerns regarding the dilution of our justice system's relationship to
democratic governance as a safeguard of "justice." The commit-
ment to justice as determined by representatives "of the people" is
giving way to resolution by those who are more likely to accommo-
date the structure, norms and needs of one set of the players-the
institutional, repeat players-involved in disputes.
B. The Embrace of and Deference to
Decision-Making by Arbitrators
More recently, the courts have embraced arbitrators as an-
other set of decision makers to whom the courts may delegate ad-
judicative responsibilities.67 Historically, merchants turned to
arbitration for cost effective and efficient resolution that would be
consistent with industry norms.68 Over the years, however, courts
have praised the process for its "simplicity, informality, and expedi-
tion '69 and expanded its permissible use to include the resolution
of statutory claims and disputes involving employers and employ-
ees, consumer companies and individual consumers, securities
dealers and individual investors, and franchisors and franchisees.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has established a preference for arbi-
tration, finding that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration...
[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration."70 Today, large numbers of dis-
67 See A. Leo Levin, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537 (1983).
68 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Story of Arbitration Law, 14, No. 6 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION. REP. 162, 163 (2003) (noting that the "many different chapters to the story of
arbitration" include "the theme of contract freedom that.., challenges the authority of the
established social hierarchy in elaborating essential norms[,J" as well as the need for Amer-
ican society to "secure a measure of workable adjudicatory justice for its citizens" and
respond to "the social thirst for fair and rational ordering").
69 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
70 Id. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983)). But see Richard Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the
Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provi-
sions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 830, 860-65 (2003) (discerning a hint in recent decisions of the
Supreme Court that it may be demonstrating less deference toward arbitration and the
achievement of judicial efficiency after "a burst of judicial exuberance").
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putes are resolved through arbitration.71 In several recent deci-
sions that have upheld mandatory arbitration clauses, a majority of
the Supreme Court has once again displayed a rather remarkable
lack of self-respect for the unique role of the courts, as democratic
institutions, to declare justice.72  In Mitsubishi, for example, the
Court observed:
[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desira-
bility of arbitration of the competence of arbitral tribunals in-
hibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means
of dispute resolution. . . By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum. 73
In Gilmer, the Court brusquely rejected "generalized attacks
on arbitration" as "far out of step with our current strong endorse-
ment of the federal statute favoring this method of resolving dis-
putes. ' 74  Professor Tom Carbonneau has written recently that
"[i]n recent case law, the right [to arbitrate] may have been trans-
formed into an obligation to arbitrate. 75
Similar to administrative adjudication, arbitration is often
sought or required by the organizations and corporations that an-
ticipate being repeat players in litigation. As arbitration has ex-
panded into areas marked by unequal bargaining relationships,
71 See Cameron Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: Private Arbitration and
the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IowA L. REV. 1337, 1339-40 (2002) (re-
porting that between 1995 and 1999, AAA's caseload grew from 55,800 to 136,673, while
JAMS' caseload grew "by more than 2,300 percent from 1987 to 1993... averaging 1,200
cases a month in 1993").
72 See Reuben, supra note 70, at 860-65. Reuben also observes that when litigants ex-
pect access to a courtroom and instead, under the doctrine of separability, are "thrust into
a forum in which standard contract defenses have no legal force[,J" and so litigants' trust in
the courts and rule of law may suffer. Id. at 848.
73 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra note 69, at 626-27.
74 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/ American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
75 Carbonneau, supra note, at 68 (emphasis added). Professor Carbonneau also argues:
The rise of arbitration demonstrates the inability of courts to remain functional when
proceedings are dominated by adversarial legal representation and an unbending
standard of due process... In different ways and to different degrees... arbitration
and mediation cure the failings of the law and the judicial process. The growing
success of these procedures argues persuasively for limiting the State's jurisdictional
authority to matters of criminal liability and to the resolution of divisive political
issues. . .Arbitration and mediation not only "deconstruct" the law, but they also
provide for "reconstruction" by acting as substitute processes for dispute resolution.
Id. See also Richard Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000).
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commentators have increasingly raised concerns regarding the
structural bias arising out of arbitrators' and arbitral organizations'
financial reliance upon these institutional, repeat users of arbitra-
tion services.76 In California, such concerns have resulted in new,
strict ethics standards requiring arbitrators to make individual dis-
closures regarding information that might indicate personal favorit-
ism towards repeat players, as well as potential bias on the part of
the provider organizations with which the arbitrators are
associated.77
The courts' standard of review to assure the justice provided
by arbitrators' decisions, meanwhile, is even more limited than that
available for reviewing the decisions of administrative judges. The
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") permits courts to vacate arbitral
awards only on the grounds of corruption or if the arbitrators have
engaged in extraordinary adjudicatory unfairness or exceeded their
powers.78 Courts have also developed three common law grounds
for vacatur-manifest disregard of the law, arbitrary or capricious
or irrational, violation of public policy-but "[s]omewhat paradoxi-
cally, the elaboration of [these] additional grounds for review in
the case law has not created a greater likelihood of vacatur. '' 79 For
example, in order to demonstrate manifest disregard of the law, an
arbitral award must display "more than an error or misunderstand-
ing with respect to the law... The error must have been obvious
and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average
person qualified to serve as an arbitrator."8 Further, in order to
show "disregard," the party seeking vacatur must be able to show
that "the arbitrator appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly gov-
erning legal principle, but decide[d] to ignore or pay attention to
it.""' Making this showing is made almost laughably difficult by
the FAA's and courts' failure to require arbitrators to explain the
76 See Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics: Winds of Reform Blowing from the West?, DisP.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 5 (describing reasons underlying establishment of new disclo-
sure requirements for arbitrators in California).
77 See id. at 6-8.
78 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10.
79 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 297 (2004).
See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Th[e]
formula [for manifest disregard of the law] is dictum, as no one has found a case where,
had it not been intoned, the result would have been different.").
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reasons for their awards.82 Once again, the courts' enthusiasm for
delegating decision-making to other adjudicators has been accom-
panied by a level of supervision that "take[s] on an air of
unreality.""
As evidenced by repeat players' dominance in the selection of
arbitrators and the near-meaninglessness of the judicial review of
arbitral decisions, the courts seem to be giving no thought to the
need to make adjuncts of the judicial system accountable in some
way to the people of a democratic nation.84 In their zeal to divert
cases to arbitrators for decision-making, the courts are further dis-
tancing the judicial system from its democratic roots.
C. The Marginalization of the Jury in Civil Litigation
Meanwhile, of course, the peculiarly democratic institution of
the civil jury has been steadily marginalized until it is now in a
near-iconic state.8 5 Historically, courts permitted cases to go to ju-
ries for fact-finding as long as the record contained evidence of
"some non-frivolous dispute about the existence or interpretation
82 See ALLAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 745 (3rd ed. 2002) (noting that "the obvious less of innumerable commercial
arbitration cases is that lack of a reasoned opinion will help to insulate an award from
judicial scrutiny."). See also Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding that because the award presented "only a cursory discussion of what
the arbitrators considered to be the key points underlying the award[,]" the court con-
cluded that "[i]t cannot be said that it clearly appears that the arbitrators identified appli-
cable law and proceeded to reach a contrary position in spite of it."); Perini Corp. v.
Greate Bay Hotel & Casino Inc., 129 N.J. 479 (N.J. 1992) (confirming arbitral award of $14
million accompanied by a one-sentence explanation, where a concurring justice observed,
"for all we know, the arbitrators concluded that the sun rises in the west, the earth is flat,
and damages have nothing to do with the intentions of the parties or the foreseeability of
the consequences of a breach.").
83 Id. at 745. Courts have even found a way to strengthen the deference that should be
shown to the awards of court-connected arbitrators in "non-binding" arbitration programs.
Increasingly, parties who have participated in non-binding arbitration may be sanctioned if
they request a trial de novo and fail to improve sufficiently upon the "advisory" arbitral
award. These disincentives become more than a little worrisome when one factors in the
reality that these arbitral proceedings are quick, and courts rarely try to match arbitrators'
substantive expertise with cases.
84 See Reuben, supra note 70, at 121-22 (finding that there is little accountability in
arbitration; also examining the extent to which arbitration is consistent with other demo-
cratic values such as participation, transparency, rationality, equality, due process, and per-
sonal autonomy and dignity).
85 See generally Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception,
and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1995).
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of a fact[.]" 86 Courts also traditionally "refrained from predicting a
reasonable jury's response. ' 'sT That stance changed after 1986, at
approximately the same time that the number of trials in federal
courts was reaching its peak.8 8 In a series of three cases, the Su-
preme Court effectively transformed summary judgment from "a
disfavored procedural shortcut"8 9 into a potent tool for winnowing
the number of cases reaching juries for disposition. The Court ac-
complished this by reducing the burden borne by those making
summary judgment motions (usually defendants) 90 and by author-
izing judges to be more expansive in "determining what issues
merit[ed] presentation ' 91 to jurors. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,92 the Supreme Court directed judges to determine whether
"the evidence [wa]s such that a reasonable jury could return a ver-
dict for the nonmoving party. ' 93 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp.9 4 permitted a trial judge to grant summary
judgment if, despite the existence of evidence to support the non-
movant's arguments regarding a genuine issue of material fact, the
judge found the nonmovant's proposed inferences "implausible." 95
One commentator has argued that "the opinion in Matsushita ap-
pears to be crafted not by a judge searching for an issue of fact for
trial, but by a panel of fact finders trying to determine a verdict." 96
In these opinions, the Supreme Court effectively reduced the
courts' traditional reliance upon and deference to the common
sense exercised by representatives "of the people" on civil juries.
Not surprisingly, a study recently conducted by Professor
Marc Galanter reveals a marked decline in jury trials and an in-
crease in disposition by summary judgment. While 5.5 % of all civil
86 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion,"
"Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commit-
ments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1036 (2003).
87 Id.
88 See Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, but Fewer Ever Get to Trial Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, § 1 at 1 (reporting that the raw number of civil trials in federal courts
"peaked in 1985 at 12,529" and that "[1last year, 4,569 civil cases were tried in federal
court").
89 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
90 See id. at 325.
91 Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judg-
ment, 100 YALE L. J. 73, 93 (1990).
92 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
93 Id. at 248.
94 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
95 Id. at 587.
96 Brian L. Weakland, Summary Judgment in Federal Practice: Super Motion v. Classic
Model of Epistemic Coherence, 94 DICK. L. REV. 25, 35 (1989).
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cases in federal court went to a jury trial in 1962, that percentage
had become a mere 1.2% by 2002.97 Simultaneously, it appears
that disposition by summary judgment has grown-from 3.7% in
1975 to 7.7% in 2000.98 Though summary judgment still involves
decision-making by a judge-not a delegate or adjunct-the
marginalization of the civil jury offers additional evidence of the
courts' increasing disengagement of adjudication from democratic
governance and accountability to common citizens.
D. Summary
A few observations are now in order. First, as the courts have
approved the delegation of adjudication to administrative judges
and arbitrators, they have permitted state-sanctioned decision-
making to migrate from a public and impartial body to third parties
often selected by one of the disputing parties-usually the institu-
tional, repeat players with greater economic strength.99 Second, as
97 See MARC GALANTER, THE VANISHING TRIAL: AN EXAMINATION OF TRIALS AND
RELATED MATTERS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 2 (Preliminary Version Oct. 24,
2003) (prepared for the Symposium on the Vanishing Trial sponsored by the Litigation
Section of the American Bar Association, San Francisco, CA, Dec. 12-14, 2003). While the
number of lawsuits filed in federal court increased by more than 500% during the period
from 1962 to 2002, the number of trials (whether jury trial or bench trial) actually declined.
This result is due to both the smaller percentage of cases going to jury trials and an even
more dramatic reduction in the number of lawsuits being decided through bench trials. In
1962, 6% of all civil cases were tried to a judge. By 2002, only .6% were decided in a bench
trial. See id.
98 See id. at 34. See also Liptak, supra note 88, quoting Gillian Hadfield, University of
Southern California. (observing that non-trial adjudication went from 32% of all civil cases
in 1970 to 50% in 2002).
99 Recently, Cullen Murphy has used multiple examples of the "outsourcing" of tradi-
tionally governmental functions (e.g., school systems, security, military, mail service, air-
ports, prisons, hospitals) to draw provocative parallels between the organization of
societies in the Middle Ages and today. Murphy observes:
[T]he historian F. L. Ganshof discerned in feudal society "a dispersal of political
authority amongst a hierarchy of persons who exercise in their own interest powers
normally attributed to the State." In the West the path away from the Middle Ages
was marked by the evolution of governments and nation-states with a sense of re-
sponsibility for the public interest rather than merely private interests. Power was no
longer a form of property. Social services and protections became a consequence of
citizenship, not a private deal between a lord and his vassals, or between a private
entity and its clients... But at some point in the late twentieth century evolution's
arrow began changing direction-toward the reprivatization of everything... What
some might call the New Feudalism, sociologists call the "externalization of state
functions." Whatever one calls it, the phenomenon is accelerating.
Feudal Gestures: Why the Middle Ages Are Something We Can Still Look Forward To, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Oct. 2003 (Vol. 292, Issue 3), at 136-37.
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the courts have come to rely on these adjuncts, they have facili-
tated a shift from decision-makers whose legitimacy rests in being
representatives of a democratic people to those who are more
likely to espouse the legal/technical norms preferred by the institu-
tional parties. To a lesser, but nonetheless significant degree, the
courts are affecting a similar shift as they abandon reliance on civil
juries and instead dispose of cases based on sterile "paper trial[s]
on the merits." 00 Ultimately, though perhaps unconsciously, the
courts seem to be distancing state-sanctioned decision-making
from the messiness of democracy and placing greater faith in the
predictability and efficiency of decision-making by organizational
technocrats.
III. THE CURRENT PLACE OF MEDIATION IN THE EVOLUTION
OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Within the last decade, another dispute resolution process-
mediation-has become the "darling" 101 of the courts. Court-con-
nected mediation programs began to appear in the 1980's and, at
this point, can be found in nearly all state and federal courts. Mag-
istrate Judge Wayne Brazil has urged that the process "democra-
tized our institution [the courts] in potentially profound ways
because mediation permitted, in fact actively encouraged, the par-
ties to decide for themselves which values were most important to
them, then to use ADR to pursue those values. ' 10 2 Has the rise of
mediation "democratized" the courts, potentially reversing the
trend described thus far in this Article? The answer to this ques-
tion depends upon one's view of the implementation of court-con-
nected mediation. As is so often the case, the devil is in the details.
There can be little doubt that the "contemporary mediation
movement"10 3 of the late 1970's and early 1980's was inspired by
the principles of democracy. Mediation proponents emphasized
the central role to be played by citizens in disputes. 04 Citizens-
not judges or attorneys or other professionals-would communicate
100 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 at 266-67 (1986).
1O Lela Love, Justice in Mediation Symposium, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
(Mar. 12, 2004) (author's recollection of speaker's remarks).
102 Brazil, supra note 3, at 110.
103 ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 1
(1994).
104 See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165 (2003).
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and negotiate directly with each other, identify the issues to be dis-
cussed, determine the substantive norms that were legitimate and
relevant (including the pursuit of harmony and reconciliation if
they wished), °5 create the options for settlement, and control the
final decision regarding whether or not to settle and on what
terms. 10 6 The mediator's role was to facilitate and to help these
disputing parties find their own voices and solutions. Ultimately,
mediation "seemed to embody both a faith in the dignity and au-
tonomy of individual citizens and a skepticism regarding the legiti-
macy of government authorities and professionals.' 01 7
Certainly, there are ways in which court-connected mediation
has stayed true to this democratic spirit. Consistent with the values
of self-determination and accountability, there is no binding out-
come in mediation unless the parties agree to it. Attorneys, who
generally attend these mediation sessions, report that their under-
standing of their clients' goals and potential solutions are influ-
enced by the clients' presence. 108 No doubt, some mediation
sessions result in creative resolutions that reflect the particular
needs, abilities, and preferences of parties. Court-connected medi-
ation also offers citizens at least some degree of participation. At
most mediation sessions, the parties attend and contribute to the
discussion either directly or through their attorneys. The parties
thus are not forced to rely blindly on their attorneys to conduct
separate, bilateral settlement negotiations.10 9
But substantial data also suggests that mediation is not infus-
ing the courts with a new manifestation of democracy. Instead, as
the courts have come to rely on mediators as the next set of judging
105 See Sternlight, supra note 26, at n. 70.
106 See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 4
(2001).
107 Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with
Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 573, 577 (2004).
108 See Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-
Connected Mediation, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 241, 309-13 (2002) (urging that court-connected
mediation has resulted in "some convergence between the structure and actions of media-
tion and traditional litigation").
109 Research suggests that because they can attend, and thus, can at least observe that
their stories are being told and considered in an even-handed and dignified proceeding,
parties are more likely to conclude that their mediation session was procedurally just. See
Welsh, supra note 7, at 838-39.
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adjuncts,110 the mediation process and the roles of both mediators
and parties have changed. When parties failed to make significant
voluntary use of mediation, courts made the process mandatory.1"
Thus, citizens lost the ability to decide for themselves whether or
not to try mediation. As attorneys have become more frequent
participants in mediation sessions and have assumed responsibility
for selecting mediators, the process has become less focused on
empowering citizens and more focused on forcing these citizens to
confront and become reconciled to the legal, bargaining and trans-
actional norms of the courthouse.112 Attorneys select fellow attor-
neys as mediators and especially value those who possess
substantive expertise and the ability to value cases and conduct
"reality testing" with the parties. 13 Many of these mediators maxi-
mize their own influence by minimizing the time spent by the par-
ties in joint session. These mediators quickly separate the parties
110 Mediators may be considered "judging adjuncts," as the role of the judge has ex-
panded to include settlement. See Resnick, supra note 19, at 654, n. 206 (noting and dem-
onstrating some judges' enthusiasm for mediators and arbitrators).
111 See Welsh, supra note 106, at 24-25 (describing the adoption of mandatory mediation
programs).
112 See Ellen Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple
Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 703, 723-57 (1997) (describing the "norm-educating"
and "norm-advocating" models of mediation that are more common in mediation pro-
grams located within institutions that have norm-enforcing mandates).
113 See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation?," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-71 (1991) (describing new techniques brought
into mediation because of the use of legal professionals as mediators); Elizabeth Ellen
Gordon, Why Attorneys Support Mandatory Mediation, 82 JUDICATURE 224, 228 (1999)
(noting that attorneys prefer mediators who are experienced trial lawyers); Barbara McA-
doo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation
Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 401, 429-30 (2002) (reporting that attorneys
place highest value on mediators' ability to value cases and experience as litigators); Bar-
bara McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Res-
olution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67
Mo. L. REV. 473, 524 (2002) (reporting that lawyers choose mediation to save litigation
expenses, speed settlement, provide needed reality check for opposing counsel and clients,
make settlement more likely, and help everyone value the case); Barbara McAdoo &
Nancy A. Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical Map? 18
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376 (1997) (reporting that the majority of Hennepin County
lawyers interviewed wanted mediators to give their view of settlement ranges); Thomas
Metzloff et al., Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and Malpractice, 60 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107, 144-45 (1997) (reporting that almost 70% of attorneys want mediators to pro-
vide opinions on the merits of cases and that attorneys highly value the mediator's substan-
tive expertise); Roselle Wissler, An Evaluation of the Common Pleas Court Civil Pilot
Mediation Project, ix (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reporting that
"[a]ttorneys had more favorable assessments of the [mediation] process and the mediator
and analyzed mediation as more helpful in achieving case objectives if the mediator evalu-
ated the merits of the case and suggested settlement options").
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and become their sole channel of communication and negotiation,
shuttling back and forth with the information and descriptions of
offers and counter-offers that will facilitate settlement. 114 Attor-
neys also now dominate the discussion and negotiation in media-
tion sessions.1 15  Indeed, in many personal injury and medical
malpractice cases, the defendants are not expected to attend medi-
ation sessions,' 16 and in some courts, parties generally are discour-
aged from attending. 117 These changes in the implementation of
mediation, though often understandable, generally have the effect
of constricting, not celebrating, citizens' ability to engage in self-
governance and demand accountability from the mediators, the
mediation process and mediated outcomes." 8 In sum, court-con-
114 See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7, at 809-13 (describing the marginalization of
joint session and rise of caucus in court-connected mediation); Welsh, Stepping Back
Through the Looking Glass supra note 107, at 669-71 (describing disputants' reactions to
caucus which relate to perceptions of procedural justice); Ian Ayres & Barry J. Nalebuff,
Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1631, 1633-34 (1997)
(describing the strategic use of caucus to avoid the communication of higher-order
information).
115 See, e.g., Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Attorneys' Negotiation Strategies in Mediation:
Business as Usual, MEDIATION Q., Vol. 17, No. 4, 377, 383 (2000). "[A]ttorneys rather
than disputants are unquestionably the main negotiators in mediated settlement confer-
ences." Id. See also Gordon, supra note 113, at 227 (reporting that in observed media-
tions, lawyers dominated negotiation, the minority of clients who did "play active roles"
were "supporting rather than starring players," and that three-quarters of responding at-
torneys disagreed with the statement, "Litigants should be the most active participants in
mediation, with attorneys standing by to offer legal advice."); Metzloff et al., supra note
113, at 123-25 (discussing the limited involvement of plaintiffs and defendants during medi-
cal malpractice mediation sessions). But see McAdoo, supra note 113, at 408 (reporting
that nearly eighty percent of attorneys perceive that mediators always or frequently en-
courage clients to participate in the mediation process).
116 See Metzloff et al., supra note 113, at 123-25. See also Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela
P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risk of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 99
(1998) (reporting that the Civil Appeals Management Plan of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit "neither expects nor requires party participation, though
mediators may invite the parties to attend the conference").
117 This is the case, for example, in the mediation program established by the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court. The order establishing the program provides that, "[aill
mediation sessions must be attended by counsel for each party with authority to settle the
matter, and, if required, such other person with actual authority to negotiate a settlement."
While the order also provides that "[t]he mediation judge may at his or her discretion
require the parties (or real parties in interest) to attend mediation," it has not been the
practice of the mediation judge to require the clients to attend. It is usually the case that
clients do not attend the mediation session. The clients that do arrive at the mediation
session with their attorneys generally are not included in most of the negotiation that oc-
curs in the session. Telephone Interview with John Gordon, Program Director, Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court Mediation Program (Feb. 28, 2001).
118 See Reuben, Dispute Resolution and Democracy, supra note 10 (suggesting several
criteria-including autonomy, participation and accountability-that should be used to ex-
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nected mediation has evolved from a process that focused on en-
hancing individual citizens' voice, control and assurance of
accountability into a mechanism that resolves cases by reconciling
these citizens to the institutional reality (or at least mediators' and
attorneys' perception of the reality) of the courts and litigation.'19
In addition, and consistent with the courts' minimal oversight
of administrative law judges and arbitrators, most courts do very
little to assure the accountability of the mediation process, individ-
ual mediators, or mediated outcomes. 120  The mediators on many
courts' rosters are private providers who are selected by attorneys
and paid by the parties, not the courts. This structure permits
court-connected mediation programs to operate quite self-suffi-
ciently and, from the courts' perspective, quite cost-effectively. In-
deed, in many states, mediation is now a business, with a small
group of insurers as repeat players and a select group of mediators
handling a large number of the cases. Though courts generally re-
quire mediation skills training in order to qualify for service on a
roster of court-connected mediators, few courts have designated a
staff member to monitor the mediators' performance, regularly ob-
serve mediation sessions, or gather and evaluate feedback from
parties and attorneys. Unfortunately, some court-connected
mediators have even welcomed the cessation of evaluation efforts
amine the relationship between democracy and arbitration); Robert Ackerman, The Ad-
ministrative Process as a Response to Tragedy: The September 11 Victim Compensation
Fund (forthcoming, on file with author) (discussing accountability in the context of the
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund).
119 See Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Justice, 69
JUDICATURE 257 (describing the evolution of judicial enthusiasm for settlement). As long
ago as 1947, one judge observed:
Pre-trial seems to have developed a method of disposing of controversies, within the
court, with the aid of lawyers, but without the delay. expense and technicality that
have cursed the judicial process for years. It eliminates appeals. It commends itself
to businessmen as a sensible and practicable procedure. It provides a method by
which disputes can be disposed of in a way that leaves all parties satisfied instead of
one or both disgruntled and with a grievance against courts and the law. It should
increase the use of the courts.
Id. at 259, quoting Harry D. Nims, Pretrial in the United States, 25 CAN. B. REv. 697. 717-18
(1947). See also Resnik. supra note 20. at 933-49 (arguing that federal courts have embraced
settlement as a result of changes in their dockets, promotion of settlement in judicial training,
and the federal courts' increasing sense of themselves as a corporate, business-like body with its
own institutional needs and agenda).
120 See Barbara McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, General Civil ADR in ADR HANDBOOK
FOR JUDGES (forthcoming, on file with author) (describing the relationship between courts
and court-connected mediators, including selection requirements, payment, quality assur-
ance and discipline).
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as a signal of the courts' confidence in them.' 2' As Magistrate
Judge Brazil has observed, courts' financial constraints must be ac-
knowledged as real and must be confronted "squarely.' 122 But, as
Brazil has also warned, the temptation to "cut administrative cor-
ners and sometimes... take great risks with quality control...
could jeopardize public confidence not only in ADR, but also in
the courts themselves.' 2 3 Such public confidence and accountabil-
ity are essential in a democracy.
Courts might also exercise quality control by carefully scruti-
nizing mediated settlement agreements, particularly when one of
the parties objects to enforcement of the agreement or seeks to set
it aside. Increasingly, courts are hearing these sorts of arguments,
often accompanied by allegations that mediators engaged in coer-
cive and/or biased behaviors. 124 Courts, however, are rarely sym-
pathetic to these parties who seek to undo settlement agreements.
Mediators' evaluative interventions, even when they are quite ag-
gressive, are unlikely to qualify as "coercive enough" to merit re-
turning cases to the courts' trial dockets.125 Indeed, some courts
seem to view unhappy parties' attempts to undo their mediated set-
tlement agreements as nothing less than an affront to the judicial
system itself. 26
Thus, courts' delegation of the settlement function to
mediators is marred by the same coupling of deference and lack of
real accountability that characterizes the courts' delegation of adju-
dicative functions to administrative and arbitral forums.
IV. RETURNING TO MEDIATION'S PROMISE AS A MEANS TO
REINVIGORATE A DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE SYSTEM
In general, the courts' current zeal for delegation combined
with the lack of meaningful accountability mechanisms threatens to
undermine the courts' entitlement to respect as democratic institu-
tions doing their best to deliver justice. Focusing on court-con-
nected ADR programs, Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil has warned
121 See JOSEPH FOLGER ET AL., A BENCHMARKING STUDY OF FAMILY, CIVIL AND CITI-
ZEN DISPUTE MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN FLORIDA 94 (2001).
122 Brazil, supra note 3, at 128.
123 Id. at 118.
124 See Welsh, supra note 106, at 9-12.
125 See id. at 74-78.
126 See Welsh, supra note 106, at 14.
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about the consequences of a single-minded focus on the achieve-
ment of efficient resolution:
[Tlhose who would insist on using only efficiency criteria to as-
sess the value of ADR programs jeopardize the courts' most
precious and only necessary assets: public confidence in the in-
tegrity of the processes the courts sponsor and public faith in the
motives that underlie the courts' actions. We must take great
care not to make program design decisions that invite parties to
infer that the courts care less about doing justice and offering
valued service than about looking out for themselves as institu-
tions (e.g., by reducing their workload, or off-loading kinds of
cases that are especially taxing or emotionally difficult or that
are deemed "unimportant.").1 27
Thus far, this Article has examined the large-scale "program
design decisions" that present a cumulative threat to the trust that
a democratic people can and should place in those entrusted with
delivering the justice that will be enforced by the state. The re-
mainder of the Article will consider the program design decisions
that can and should be made in order to reassure citizens that the
courts and their adjuncts-at least mediators as settlement ad-
juncts-remain accountable to "the people" and thus can be
trusted to deliver justice.128
The first program design choice actually involves ADR advo-
cates more than it does courts. In the last couple of decades,
mediators and mediation advocates have done their share of bash-
ing the courts and the public justice system, as part of a strategy to
justify replacing judges with someone or something else. But the
common good of a democratic nation benefits from the existence
of a sufficiently-supported and accountable public justice system.
Mediation advocates need to help our courts overcome their cur-
rent problems and regain an appropriate measure of self-respect
for their unique role in enabling a democratic people to govern
themselves. This means, of course, becoming advocates for suffi-
cient funding for courts, the appointment of sufficient numbers of
judges and the protection of judges' independence from inappro-
priate economic or political influence. ADR experts who have
traveled to other countries to teach or consult regarding ADR
have realized that healthy ADR programs require healthy judicial
127 Brazil, supra note 3, at 124.
128 See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 120 (proposing several reforms, some of which are
included here).
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systems. 129 The same mutually symbiotic relationship should exist
in the United States.
The second program design choice is likely to appear painful,
but may be less so than it first seems. Courts should end their reli-
ance on mandatory mediation.130 The courts are lending their le-
gitimacy to mediation in requiring its use. The combination of
mandatory programs and a lack of significant accountability mea-
sures, however, invite abuse and a potential deterioration of the
courts' legitimacy. If mediation is truly a valuable process that re-
sponds to citizens' desires for an alternative means to resolve dis-
putes, the process should be able to stand on its own, freely
selected by parties as their disputes arise. At the very least, the
courts' authority to mandate mediation should sunset within two to
three years after a court-connected mediation program has been
introduced. During this initial phase, attorneys will become edu-
cated about the process.13 1 Research indicates that once attorneys
use mediation, they become advocates for its future use. If attor-
neys have not become advocates, there is probably something
wrong with the program, and it deserves to end.
Finally, and especially while the use of mediation is mandatory
or strongly encouraged by judges, the courts should view mediators
as their agents-and provide for meaningful oversight that assures
just resolution.1 32 Courts can accomplish such oversight by estab-
lishing expectations beyond settlement for their mediators. The
procedural justice literature provides a rich set of measures of
those behaviors that are likely to be perceived as just.133 Courts
also should assign staff to monitor mediators' performance through
periodic observations, distribution and assessment of meaningful
post-mediation surveys and interviewing of attorneys and parties.
129 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondence and Contradictions in International and
Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J.
Disp. RESOL. 319 n. 104 (urging that the "absence of a legitimate and trusted legal system
prevents full assimilation and acceptance of a supplementary set of institutions to offer
different forms of conflict resolution" but noting that others argue otherwise).
130 See generally Hensler, supra note 104, at 165.
131 See Welsh, supra note 106, at 24.
132 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, particularly Canon 3, should also be
revised to make it clear that judges have an obligation to oversee those to whom they have
delegated the settlement function. See Canon 3, "A Judge Should Perform the Duties of
the Office impartially and Diligently," available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.
html#3 (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
133 See Welsh, supra note 7, at 817-26.
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Such monitoring exists in good court-connected programs. It
should be common in all programs. 134
Though procedural justice often results in perceptions of sub-
stantive justice, courts also need to do more to ensure that medi-
ated outcomes are fair according to some principled set of norms.
One alternative is to require courts to review and approve medi-
ated settlement agreements. Obviously, this option presents diffi-
culties for an already-overloaded system and is likely to result in
replication of the deferential standards of review that afflict other
contexts. Alternatively, courts could provide a short cooling-off
period for mediated settlement agreements, during which the par-
ties themselves could evaluate the fairness of the outcome-using
whatever norms they deem legitimate-and choose to accept or re-
scind their agreements without penalty. Such cooling-off periods
are relatively common in divorce and child custody mediation and
are relatively straightforward mechanisms to ensure that parties
perceive their agreements as sufficiently just. From the courts' per-
spective, the adoption of cooling-off periods for mediated agree-
ments would signal mediators' ultimate accountability to the
citizens involved in this court-connected process. A cooling-off pe-
riod would reward productive mediator behaviors that build par-
ties' commitment to and investment in their agreements and create
a negative consequence for those mediators who employ aggressive
tactics that endanger courts' legitimacy as the domain in which citi-
zens will experience justice.135
CONCLUSION
The judicial system of the United States seems to be changing,
and mediation is playing one small part in that change. Yet, change
should be tempered by context, and even as the judicial system
changes, it should reflect the values of our democracy. Our courts
draw their legitimacy from their accountability to, and the respond-
ing support of, a democratic people. Within the context of democ-
racy, judicial adjuncts exercising public functions must also be held
134 See Sharon Press, Building and Maintaining a Statewide Mediation Program: A View
from the Field, 81 Ky. L. J. 1029, 1030 (1993) ("[M]erely providing the statutory mecha-
nism for sending cases to mediation, without creating a central office to assist the oversight
of the program, may be an inappropriate delegation of court authority and result in an
inadequate method of overseeing the provision of justice.").
135 See Welsh, supra note 106, at 91-92.
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accountable for the justice of their decision-making procedures and
outcomes.
Perhaps mediation, which has so far played a relatively small
role in the judicial system's larger evolution, can play a much more
significant part in helping the courts reconcile the need for delega-
tion (or more pejoratively, "outsourcing") and accountability. Me-
diation may then become an important complement that helps the
courts play their appropriate role in the lives of the citizens in a
democratic nation.
